Essays on Philanthropy by Svítková, Katarína
 1 
Referee report on the Ph.D-dissertation of Katarina Svitkova, ‘Essays on 
Philanthropy’ 
 
By René Bekkers, Utrecht University, the Netherlands; and Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
 
January 26, 2007 
 
This dissertation consists of three papers on philanthropy. The first two papers 
analyze theoretically the behavior of certification agencies of nonprofit organizations 
and these nonprofit organizations themselves. The third paper analyzes empirically 
the sponsoring and philanthropic activities of corporations in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Each individual paper has considerable merits. The first two papers are 
analytically clear, based on sound assumptions, and reach important insights in the 
behaviour of nonprofit organizations and certification agencies. The strength of the 
third paper on corporate philanthropy is the empirical analysis. There are not many 
studies available on the topic that use methods of comparable quality. The chapters 
are written in relatively good English. I am not familiar with the standard practice in 
what constitutes a good PhD thesis in the Czech Republic. But judging from what 
constitutes a PhD thesis in the US, this one is good. Taken together, the three papers 
make a very fine dissertation, and I recommend the author to be admitted to the 
defense.  
 
Each of the three papers has enough potential to enable publication in international 
academic journals. However, each paper also has its shortcomings. None of these 
shortcomings are critical. But addressing them may increase chances of publication of 
each of these papers. Therefore, I will identify some shortcomings and give a few 
suggestions to deal with them. 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 are based on rather crude assumptions (page 4-6). An obvious 
question that needs to be addressed is how the results of these chapters change as the 
assumptions are made more realistic.  
 
In chapter 1, it is assumed that the quality of charities is not observed by donors [F3]. 
This assumption does not hold for many fundraising organizations that provide 
services to members or clients, especially in competitive markets. Members and 
clients evaluate these services, and compare them to services of competing 
organizations. Examples are hospitals, sports clubs, and cultural organizations that 
offer courses. Does certification of such nonprofit organizations make sense? I would 
say less so than certification of nonprofit organizations the output of which is more 
difficult to evaluate. 
 
With regard to donor motivation [F4], it is simply assumed in both chapters that 
donors care about the quality of the output of charities. However, from empirical 
research we know that for many donors this is not the case. In the dominant model of 
philanthropy, the impure altruism model (Andreoni, 1990), donors care mostly about 
the act of giving, and not about the output of charities. In that case, a good type is not 
preferred to a bad apple. One may save the assumption of a preference for certified 
charities by assuming that the act of giving to a certified charity yields more utility 
than the act of giving to a non-certified charity. One reason why this may be the case 
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is that donors talk with each other about the quality of charities and dislike a 
reputation of being a person who wastes money on dishonest charities. Another 
reason why donors may prefer certified charities is that any certificate – even a 
certificate awarded by the industry itself and that does not involve any independent 
external monitoring – affects consumer behaviour. 
 
The implication of the assumption of altruistic motivation (or impurely altruistic 
motivation by the wish to avoid wasting money on dishonest charities) is that donors 
prefer certified charities. However, donors will adjust their reaction to certification if 
they learn that the detection technology is imperfect. Donors will be more likely to 
favour certified charities when they have more reasons to believe in the quality of 
detection technology. When they know (or suspect) that a large fraction of bad apples 
go undetected, they are less likely to prefer certified charities. It is unclear how this 
affects the results of the models. It may strengthen the conclusions on page 22 and 47. 
Lower fees attract bad apples who are detected; if detection of bad apples is made 
public this enhances the credibility of the certifier and the preference for certified 
agencies. 
 
An interesting implication of the model that deserves more attention is that increasing 
accountancy fees lower the amount donated to charities. Fewer charities apply when 
the fee for certification increases. The fee increases when the costs of detection 
technology increase. As the costs of detection technology depend heavily on the fees 
of accountancy firms, increasing accountancy fees lower the amount donated to 
charities. 
 
The discussion of practical implications at the end of chapter 1 needs some more 
work. A discussion is needed of the problem of the credibility of the certification 
agency. In transition and developing countries, with a higher level of corruption, 
certification agencies are less likely to be trusted by potential donors when the 
certification agency is funded by state subsidies. The model shows that a for-profit 
certifier would certainly be undesirable. The implication is that certification agencies 
in corrupt countries should be foreign-based, nonprofit organizations. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the behaviour of fundraising nonprofits rather than the 
certification agencies. The basic result makes sense theoretically. It also supports the 
assumption of chapter 1 that donors prefer certified charities. However, several 
studies have failed to show that quality of firms improves due to the introduction of a 
certification system (Terlaak & King, 2006). 
 
Several assumptions of the model are not in line with stylized facts. Donors do not 
know the costs of certification and the quality of the detection technology. Evidence 
from a bi-monthly survey in the Netherlands (not available in English, unfortunately) 
suggests that donors underestimate the costs of certification. The Dutch think that 
certification is paid for by government subsidies. In the mean time, they overestimate 
the quality of detection technology. For instance, the Dutch think that certification 
includes guarantees on how much is spent on programs, while this is not the case.  
 




In my view, chapter 3 would benefit from a change in focus. As it is now, the chapter 
focuses on the effect of changes in the tax regime, which, judging from the empirical 
results, appears to be of little influence on corporate philanthropy. There are several 
directions in which the chapter can be rewritten. One involves an exploitation of the 
country differences. In the empirical results, there are numerous differences between 
CR and SR. The chapter contains an implicit explanation for these differences: CR is 
a more modern country that resembles more strongly the situation in the US and 
western Europe. Because theories on corporate philanthropy are a product from these 
regions, it is not surprising they work less well in SR.  
 
Another potential direction involves a stronger emphasis on firm specific effects. The 
most relevant question here may be how firms divide their philanthropic effort 
between giving and sponsoring. On page 81 it is concluded that the results suggest 
that sponsoring and giving are substitutes. However, in the next paragraph, I read that 
‘the difference between sponsoring and giving may result from their different 
nature…’. And also on page 82 it is concluded that ‘there is a difference in the 
motivation for sponsoring and giving’. These conclusions sound like a contradiction 
to the preceding statement that giving and sponsoring are substitutes. And also: the 
arguments are in fact hypotheses that can – and should – be  tested. Developing these 
hypotheses and testing them would make the chapter more interesting.  
 
The methodological discussion on page 83 I found a little confusing. The Heckman 
Two Stage procedure can be used to deal with item non-response only if all sampled 
observations in fact do have a true value. If all firms give, but in the sample some 
firms refuse to give information on their behaviour, the effects of firm characteristics 
on reporting are taken into account in the second stage. However, not all firms do 
give. In this case, missing values may mean no giving or refusing to give information 
on giving. And then there is even a third problem: systematic non-response. Firms 
that do not give are less likely to participate in a survey on corporate philanthropy. 
Because firms that do not give are systematically different from firms that do, the 
results cannot be generalized to the whole population of firms. 
 
Another problem on page 83 is the assumption that all reported amounts are valid. 
The fact that firms are willing to report an amount does not mean that report is valid.  
 
Finally, chapter 3 would benefit from a systematic evaluation of the theories outlined 
in the beginning of the chapter based on the empirical results. Which theory is 
supported most strongly by the results, and why may that be the case? Because some 
theories are more valid than others or because of methodological reasons? In both 
cases, it would be good to discuss the implications for research on corporate 
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